In Fellow Creatures, Korsgaard examines the relationships between humans and other animals, but from a purely philosophical perspective.
Oxford University Press (2018) Authors Christine Marion Korsgaard Harvard University Abstract Christine M. Korsgaard presents a compelling new view of our moral relationships to the other animals. Samuel Scheffler fFellow Creatures Our Obligations to the Other Animals Christine M. Korsgaard fGreat Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. After examining some reasons why we treat humans and animals differently, and showing that they do not imply the superior importance of humans, it argues that the claim of superior human importance is not so much false as (nearly) incoherent. Fellow Creatures Our Obligations to the Other Animals Christine M. Korsgaard. Korsgaard, Christine M. Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals. Download the eBook Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals in PDF or EPUB format and read it directly on your mobile phone, computer or any device. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Use features like bookmarks, note taking and highlighting while reading Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals (Uehiro Series in Practical Ethics). Pp. mals; and he now no longer regarded them as fellow creatures, but as means and instruments to be used at will for the attainment of whatever ends he pleased. In Fellow Creatures, Harvard philosophy professor Christine Korsgaard challenges this attitude and argues that humans have obligations to other sentient creatures, that is, other creatures who can feel pleasure or pain, and that our sense of human superiority does not confer on us the right to treat other creatures merely as means to gratify our own ends. In Fellow Creatures, Harvard philosophy professor Christine Korsgaard challenges this attitude and argues that humans have obligations to other sentient creatures, that is, other creatures who can feel pleasure or pain, and that our sense of human superiority does not confer on us the right to treat other creatures merely
Furthermore, by focusing on Kant’s influential views on non-human animals, Korsgaard offers another lesson – she models for the reader how to explore important but less obvious features of someone’s thinking. Laid out in … Human Beings as Ends-in-Themselves1,2 ... Kant’s arguments reveal the ground of our obligations to the other animals.
Download the eBook Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals in PDF or EPUB format and read it directly on your mobile phone, computer or any device. Human Beings as Ends-in-Themselves1,2 Perhaps no theme of Kant’s ethics resonates more clearly with our ordinary moral ideas than his dictum that a human being should never be used as a mere means to an end. Immanuel Kant 1 Any action whereby we may torment animals, or let them suffer distress, or oth-erwise treat them without love, is demeaning to ourselves. The first claim commits us to joining with other autonomous beings in relations of reciprocal moral lawmaking.
own.’ Christine Korsgaard’s new book Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals aims to expand this percep-tion of the value of another to include all creatures which have interests of their own - regardless of the species to which they happen to belong. Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals. Korsgaard: Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals p. 2 I. Only a teleological picture of the world that made human good the ultimate purpose of the world could support the conclusion that humans are more important than the other animals. $24.95 (cloth). In Fellow Creatures, Harvard philosophy professor Christine Korsgaard challenges this attitude and argues that humans have obligations to other sentient creatures, that is, other creatures who can feel pleasure or pain, and that our sense of human superiority does not confer on us the right to treat other creatures merely
Animals and Rational Animals I am going to begin by laying out a conception of what an animal is, and how a rational animal is different from a non-rational one. Korsgaard, Christine M. Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Forthcoming. PDF | Kantian ethics has struggled terribly with the challenge of incorporating non-human animals as beings to which we can owe obligations.
Download Article: Download (PDF 162.7 kb) Author: Svoboda, Toby. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Christine Korsgaard, Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals. A Kantian Case for Our Obligations to the Other Animals 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Kant’s Copernican Revolution 8.3 The Concept of an End in Itself